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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF T'HE STATE OF UTAH
rr,AI(ATARO SHIBA, 1fiYOE
SHIBA,
Plaintiffs,
Case
No. 8247

-YS.-

JOHN WEISS, HENDRY D. SPENCER and HELEN BETHERS,
Defendants.

Appellants' Brief
PRELil\IINARY STArr,ElVIENT
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from a judgment
of the Third Judicial District Court by the Honorable
A. H. Ellett, dismissing the action upon its merits. This
trial involved the consolidation of four law suits growing out of this particular accident, namely cases 98655,
·which is this case, 99868, 99687 and 99291.
FACTS
The follo,ving facts out of \Yhich this case arises are
established without serious dispute. This case grows out
of an accident involving a truck and t-\vo cars, a few miles
1
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west of the Stra,vberry Reservoir. rrhe truck involved
was owned by defendant Weiss, and \vas being driven
easterly along High\Yay 40 toward the Stra,vberry Reservoir. The Shimoda car \Vas traveling east in the same
direction and following the truck. The Bether 's car was
traveling westerly. The Shimoda car struck the truck
"\xt~hich was parked "\vithout lights and the Bether 's car
then ran into the Shimoda car. The plaintiffs are the
father and mother of one Y oshiro George Shiba, who
resided in Salt Lake City, and the defendant John Weiss,
is the O"\vner of a 1946 Dodge Pickup (Tr. 58), which he
allowed the defendant to take on the early morning of
October 19, 1953. (Tr. 166). The defendant Dellis Spencer resides at Neola, Utah, but V\7 0rked at rrodd Park (Tr.
81). Defendant Spencer left the \V eiss home in Salt Lake
City about 3:10 A. M. on October 19, 1953, (Tr. 82), and
drove the truck on the \vay to his home, proceeding
through Parleys Canyon to IIeber and out · through
Daniels Canyon, to\vard the Stra-\vberry. Defendant
Spencer drove the truck about a half a mile past the
last turn before coming to the \vest entrance of Bull
Springs Road and High\vay 40. (Tr. 86). At a point
approximately 750 feet west of the entrance of the
Bull Springs Road into Highway 40, the lights of the
Weiss truck, being driven hy Spencer, \vent out, while
traveling on the right hand side of the road. (Tr. 89).
The defendant then applied the brakes and clutch and
brought the car to rest traveling about 12 or 15 feet (Tr.
90), stopping with t'vo "'"heels off the hard surface of
the road, about a. foot and a half or two feet off of the
road and \vith the "rheels on the hard surface, not parallel
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\vith the shoulder. ( Tr. 91). After the Spencer truck
came to rest it was struck in the rear by the Shimoda
car, and while the Shimoda car was traveling from the
initial impact, the Shimoda car then had a collision with
the Bether's car, traveling in a westerly direction. (Tr.
98). The Weiss truck \Vas being driven by l\fr. Spencer
himself. The Shimoda car, traveling in an easterly direction was occupied by the O\vner, Mr. Shimoda and 1\Ir.
Shiba, and the Bether 's car, traveling westerly, was
driven by Miss Bethers, and had as occupants, John
Osborne and ~lr. Iorg, the owner. The accident occurred
at about 5:50 A. ~I., on the morning of October 19, 1953.
The occupants of the Shimoda car \Vere killed, and the
owner of the Iorg car was killed.
Other undisputed facts are that the highway at the
scene of the accident \Vas 22 feet "ride, a barro\v pit on
either side of the road, and that the point of impact was
determined by Officer Mason Hill, at approximately 6:50
A. M., after the accident from the debris, oil marks and
gouges in the road.
As to most of the other facts in the case, there is a
sharp dispute in the evidence. Chiefly as to whether or
not Shiba or Shimoda \Vas the driver of the Shimoda
automobile.
Officer Mason Hill, \vho investigated the accident,
was called by Mr. Lowe, the attorney for the administrator of the Iorg Estate, Case No. 99686, which was one
of the four cases consolidated for trial. Mr. Hill arrived
3
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at the scene of the accident about 40 minutes after it
happened, and upon cross-examination of the witness by
Mr. Hanson, attorney for the respondent, testified as
follows:

"Q. N O\V, with reference to the Japanese car,
did you make any observation of the people in
that car~

A. I did.

Q. Just tell the court and jury

,,~hat

you sa'v

and \vhere those people \Vere in the car.
A. Well, the youngest Japanese boy by the
name of Shiba \vas laying in the front of the car
under the steering ,,-heel \vith his buttocks still
on the seat and his head do\vn on the floor ( Tr.
24) boards, ~ndQ. And \vhere was-just go ahead, sir .
.A. -and the older of the J apanese-I don't
recall his name right now-he \Vas hanging out
of the right front corner of the car, which had
been torn away. He \vas hanging out there, and
he had bled to death there. There was a pool of
blood on the highway wh.ere he had bled to death
hanging out of the car." (Tr. 25)
On further cross exan1ination by ~Ir. Beatie, the

witness testified as follo\vs:
'' Q. And in response to a question of l\lr.
Hanson, you stated that the position of the bodies
of the t'vo Japanese, Shimoda and Shiba, in the
car were the same as at the time the cars came
to rest after the impact. You don't know that to
be a fact of your O"\Vn knowledge, do you?

A. No." (Tr. 46)
4
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'' Q. You didn't check the back seat, did you,
l\Ir. Hill, at the scene of the accident~

A. No, I don't think I did.
Q. Yon don't know w"hether there Vilas blood
in the back sent or not, do you~

A. No, I dont. (Tr. 65)
Donald A. Harris, a mail truck driver was the first
person at the scene of the aecident, and testified on
direct examination for the appellant as follows:

Q. Which car?
A. The car sitting crossways of the road, the
car ""ith the Japanese fello,vs in it, and I shined
my light on the face of the car, and I could see
that the one fello'v \Vas hanging out of the car,
and then it made me sick, and I turned away from
it for just a fe·w· short seconds. I \Vas sick to my
stomach, and just then this other guy arrived on
the scene. He was a deer hunter.

Q. \\1"'ith relation to this particular man, do
you kno'v which direction he came from l\Ir.
Harris?
A. He came from Daniels Canyon. He \vas
traveling in the same direction as I was.
Q. What did you do, and \vhat did you ohserveo?

it. Well, I seen that this car crossed the road,
and all I done is \Vent around and shined my light
on the guy hanging out the door, and that is as
far as I observed the \vreck at all.

Q. Did you observe anyone else in the front
seat of the Shimoda car'?
_.:\_. No, I didn't. ('Tr. 69-70)
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Q. What did he do \Yith the flashlight, and
'vha t \Vas said'
A. \V ell, before he got the flashlight, he said,
"Is anybody else hurt~'' and I says, "I don't
kno\v. I haven't looked.'' That \\7 aS when I "ras
sick, pretty upset about it, so he got my light and
walked around the other side of the car.

Q. Now, that is the Shimoda car'?
.A.. Yes.

Q. Yes. What did he do, and "l"hat \Vas said 1
. A.. l-Ie shined his light in, and he said, ''There
is another guy in the back seat. In the back'' is
what he said. ''There is another guy in the back.''
I took it for granted he meant more or less in the
back seat. (Tr. 74)
This witness on redirect examination stated:

Q. Will you tell me then "?hat this man did
\vith relation to your flashlight?
A. He took my light and "Talked to the other
side of the car.

Q. \Vhat car o]
. A. The Shimoda car.'' ( R. 79)

"Q. Is that the time that he told you there
a J ap dead in the back ?

\\~as

.A. Who told me ·J

Q. rrhis deer hunter .
. . \. Yes.

Q. Are you sure that the deer hunter had not
used his flashlight to look into the Bethers car at
that time and seen ~ir. Iorg in the back seat there 1
6
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A. I don't know whether he did or not.
Q. In other words, he could have been refer-

ring to someone in the Bethers car as well as the
Japanese car when he came up to you, could he
not~

A. He could have been.''
On the question of the position of the cars, Officer
Hill on cross examination testified as follows:

'' Q. Do yon know whether or not those men,
either of them had been moved before you arrived
on the scene~
A. No, they had not.'' ( Tr. 25)
On further cross examination by l\Ir. Beatie the
officer testified as follows:

''Q. You haYe no way of knowing how many
people had been at the scene of the accident and
had left or had arrived at the scene of the accident prior to your arrival at approximately six
thirty~

A. No, I don't.
Q. And you do not kno\\"' whether or not the

automobiles "rere in the exact position as they
finally came to rest after both the first and second
impact or \vhether they had been moved, do you~
.A.. No, I do11t." ( Tr. 46)

*

:!(:

*

Q. You don't kno\v \vhether the respective cars

had been moved from one position to another and
were in different position at the time you arrived
at six thirty or not, do you 1
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The second point is the restriction of counsel for
appellant by the Hon . ....:.\.. H. Ellett in requiring him to
consolidate with Counsel :IYir. W a tkiss and ~lr. Y ano,
who represented Reade Shimoda, administratrix of the
Estate of George Shimoda as a party defendant in case
No. 99687.
"THE COURT: ..._!\Jl counsel have passed the
jury for cause, you may strike three challenges.
I believe that is for each car, isn't it. Counsel
interested in the same side 'vill have to join in
the challenge. ( Tr. 12)
THE COURT: The parties in the car proceeding easterly that ran into the truck "\\.,.ould have
three, and the parties in the car coming westerly
"\\.,.ould have three.
MR. BE1\._TIE: The only thing, there is involved this "'ay-there are t,,~o different suits.
Shimoda has one. I believe I "\vould be entitled to
at least in my suit, which is a death case, to three
challenges in favor of the Shibas, ''"'ould I not1
You mentioned theTHE COUR,T: 1,.. ou are going to 'vin together
or lose together, aren ~t you?
1\IIi. BE .I\_ TIE: ~\ ot of necessit.v. I have the
-

t'

question of the guest arising "\Yhich is a solewith my case alone, \,..our Honor. The others are
not involved in any guest question.
THE COURT: That is right, you \\ 0uld have
the question of guest, but, after all, you have got
to sho'v the negligence on the other part.
7
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~IR.

BEATIE: That's true. I was just wondering if I have to associate my challenges with
l\Ir. Watkiss and Mr. Yano, though, how we are
going to split it. I might want two and they want
t\vo, and \Ve \vouldn 't come out right. ( Tr. 13)
~IR.

BEATIE: To that ruling, Your Honor,
just as a matter of record, may I have an exception?" (Tr. 14)
POINTS TO BE ARGUED
1. rri-IAT YOSHIRA GEORGE SHIBA, WHILE

DRIVING AN AUT01tiOBILE OWNED BY GEORGE
SHI~IODA, ~EGLIGENTLY DROVE SAID AUTOMOBILE INTO THE DEFENDANT'S TRUCK, AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
2. ERROR IN REQUIRING APPELLANTS TO
CONSOLIDATE THEIR PREEMPTORY CHALLENGES WITH THE DEFENDANT SHIMODA IN
ANOTHER ACTION WHICH WAS CONSOLIDATED
AT TRIAL.
This point is moot unless the first point is found
in favor of appellants.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THAT YOSHIRA GEORGE SHIBA,
WHIL:BJ DRIVING AN AUT01IOBILE OWNED BY
GEORGE SHIMODA, NEGLIGENTLY DROVE SAID
.AlJTO?\IOBILE INTO THE DEFENDANT'S TRUCI<:
AS A MATTER OF I.JAW.
9
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It is apparent from the holding of the court that the
court must have concluded that Shiba was the driver of
the Shimoda automobile and was therefore guilty of
negligence as a matter of law under the rule of Dalley
vs. Mid West Dairy Products Company. It is our position that the evidence is not conclusive on this question.
The testimony of Mason W. Hill, the investigating
officer who arrived on the scene at least 40 minutes after
the accident happened, is contrary to the evidence of
Donald Harris, who was the first known person to arrive
at the scene of the accident, and testified as to the statement which he heard the deer hunter make after he had
borrowed his flashlight, "That there was a dead man in
the back of the car. ' ' The court seems to have taken the
position that the testimony of Officer Hill was conclusive
of the position of the bodies at the time of the accident,
and upon this point counsel disagrees with the trial court.
I~

is the contention of appellants that the conflict in
testimony a.s to the driver of the Shimoda automobile
is a jury question there being a conflict in the testimony
as aforesta ted.
It is said in Sec. 325, 33 Am. eJur., page 263:
"U11certain Proof: Conflict of Evidence.
"A motion for nonsuit should be granted only
""here there is no contriety of evidence as to the
facts, and not '"'here the evidence raises a question
for the jury."

Sec. 1126-53 Am. J ur. 782:

10
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Decision at Close of Plaintiff's Testimony;
Nonsuit.
d

''A motion to take a case from the jury on the
ground of the insufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence should be denied, 'vhere there is evidence
which justifies an inference of facts upon which
hi8 right to recover depends.''
In the fairly recent case of Winegar v. Slim Olson,
Inc., 252 Pac. ( 2d), page 205, Justice McDonough stated
as follo,vs at page 206:
''In ruling on a motion for nonsuit it is well
established that where a jury sits the court must
accept as true the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff, and must give the plaintiff the benefit of
every fair and legitimate inference that could be
drawn therefrom by the jury. McGarry v. Tanner
& Bakes Co., 21 Utah 16, 59 P. 93; Smith v. Columbus Buggy Co., 40 Utah 580, 123 P. 580; Dunn v.
Salt Lake. & 0. R,. Co., 47 Utah 137, 151 P. 979;
Kitchen v. Kitchen, 83 Utah 370, 28 P. 2d 180. If
at th~ conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence the
court decides that the plaintiff has not established
a prima facie case or cause of action against the
defendant a judgment of nonsuit may be properly
entered. Ibid. In order to establish a prima facie
case the plaintiff must present some competent
evidence on every element needed to make out the
cause of action. The test is 'vhether or not there
is some substantial evidence in support of every
essential fact which a plaintiff is required to prove
in order to entitle him to recover. Robinson v.
Salt T_)ake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 P. 817. If the
evidence and the inferences are of such character
as would authorize reasonable men to arrive at
different conclusions as to "vhether all the essential facts were or were not proved then the ques11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion is one for the jury and a non-suit should be
denied. Robinson v. Salt Lake City, supra."
From the foregoing, it is contended by the appellants that there being a conflict in the evidence as to the
driver of the Shimoda automobile, that it was error for
the court to nonsuit the plaintiff at the conclusion of the
evidence adduced in the four consolidated cases on the
part of plaintiffs.
The appellant contends that reasonable men could
have arrived at different conclusions as to whether or not
Shiba was the driver of the Shimoda car and therefore
it was a jury question.

POINT II. ERROR IN REQUIRING APPELLANTS
TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR PRE-EMPTORY CHALLENGES WITH THE DEFENDANT SHIMODA IN
ANOTHER ACTION WHICH WAS CONSOLIDATED
AT TRIAL.

'

This point is moot unless the first point is found
in favor of appellants.
On the question of pre-emptory challenges to the
jury, the Utah Statute is as follows:
Rule 47, Subsection (c), U.C ...L\_. 1953: Either
party may challenge the jurors, but \vhere there
are seYeral parties on either side, they must join
in a challenge before it can be made.
The above statute is a combination of the former
statutes 104-24-2 and 104-24-3, U.C ..z\. 1943.
12
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In the case of Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co., 68 Ut. 85,
249 Pac. 437, the same statutes were involved as are
herein set forth. In this case the two parties defendant
were required to combine their challenges and while in
the present case appellant was required to combine his
challenges with a party defendant in another action, the
basis of adjudication being that they were involved in
the same automobile.
The court in that case said at page 458:
"Such cases as the one at bar are not of frequent occurrence. When, however, such cases do
occur, it is not a satisfactory reason to say a substantial right should be denied because it may
possibly lead to subsequent abuses. I am irr~sis
tibly impressed with the conviction that the rule
announced by the courts of Texas, Michigan, and
Wisconsin, which I have briefly reviewed in this
opinion, is more consonant with reason and justice, and therefore more likely to have been within
the intent of our Legislature, than is the rule
invoked in behalf of respondent. The statute
which requires the ''parties on either side to join''
should only be regarded as a precaution to the
trial court to see that the right of severance in
challenges shall not be permitted except in cases
where it is manifest from the very nature of the
case, that even-handed justice requires it.
I am of opinion the challenge should have been
allowed, and that the denial thereof was prejudicial error.''
In the case of Maddox vs. Pattison, 186 So. 894, the
court said:
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''This action arose out of a collision between
two trucks. Mrs. Maddox and Buckline instituted
separate suits against defendant on separate
causes of action. It is true the proceedings grew
out of the same vehicular collision, and the issues
in both causes respecting the defendant's liabilitv
are identical, yet on the other hand, it is to b~
noted that the issues pertaining to the extent of
the injuries sustained are not the same, the parties
litigant are different and separate judgments were
and are required to be rendered.
"The D. S. Supreme Court offered the following pertinent remark in the case of Mutual Life
Ins. Co. vs. Hillman, 145 U.S. 283, 12 S. Ct. 909,
912, 36 L. Ed. 706-707. ''But although the defendants might lawfully be compelled at the discretion of the court to try the cases together, the
causes of action remained distinct, and required
separate verdicts and judgments, and no defendant could be deprived, without its consent, of any
right, material to its defense, whether by way of
challenge to jurors or of objection to evidence, to
which it would have been entitled if the cases had
been tried separately. Sec. 819 of the revised
statutes provides that in all civil cases each party
shall be entitled to three pre-emptory challenges,
and in all eases 'vhere there are several defendants, or several plaintiffs, the parties on each
side shall be deemed a single party for the purposes of all challenges and under this section,
under this provision, defendants sued together
upon one cause of action, would be entitled to
three pre-emptory challenges in all. But defendants in different actions cannot be deprived of
their several challenges, by the order of the court,
made for the prompt and c.onvenient administration of justice, that the three cases shall be tried
together.''

14
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court erred
in the rna tter of directing a nonsuit against the plaintiff
and invading the province of the jury in so ruling, and
that if this point is sustained, that the court erred in
requiring appellant to consolidate his challenges with a
defendant in another action.
Respectfully submitted,

W. D. BEATIE
.Attorney for Plaintiffs and
.Appellants.
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